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Abstract—The paper proposes StegTorrent a new network 
steganographic method for the popular P2P file transfer 
service—BitTorrent. It is based on modifying the order of data 
packets in the peer-peer data exchange protocol. Unlike other 
existing steganographic methods that modify the packets’ 
order it does not require any synchronization. Experimental 
results acquired from prototype implementation proved that it 
provides high steganographic bandwidth of up to 270 b/s while 
introducing little transmission distortion and providing 
difficult detectability. 
Keywords: network steganography, BitTorrent, information 
hiding, P2P 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
BitTorrent [1], [2], a file-transfer system originally 
released in July 2001, is currently the most popular P2P 
(Peer-to-Peer) networking system worldwide [3] that allows 
users to share particular resources in the form of files. 
Studies show that the number of users exceeded 100 million 
in 2011, and that BitTorrent traffic accounts for about 94% 
of all P2P traffic, and is responsible for about 22% of North 
American fixed access daily traffic [4], which is 
continuously increasing each year. The success of BitTorrent 
primarily comes from two factors: its efficiency and 
openness. BitTorrent is significantly more efficient than 
classical client/server-based architectures. It allows peers 
sharing the same resource to form a P2P network, and then it 
focuses on fast and efficient replication to distribute the 
resource. It is also worth noting that because in BitTorrent a 
resource is divided into many fragments, a single peer is able 
to download many fragments simultaneously and it does not 
need the whole resource to share it. Additionally, BitTorrent 
software is free to download and many clients’ versions are 
open source. This leads to the easy deployment of new 
applications and technologies, therefore stimulating further 
improvements. 
Steganography encompasses all concealing techniques 
that embed a secret message into the carrier of this message 
in such a way that the carrier modification caused by the 
embedding of the steganogram must not be “noticeable” to 
anyone. It is important to emphasize that, for a third party 
observer who is not aware of the steganographic procedure, 
the exchange of steganograms remains hidden. Currently, 
one of the most dynamically evolving steganography 
subdisciplines is network steganography [10]. To perform 
hidden communication, it utilizes network protocols and/or 
relationships between them as the secret data carriers. Many 
methods were proposed and were aimed at specific network 
protocols from TCP/IP stack, for example, IP, TCP, UDP, 
and so on, or the whole service, for example, VoIP (Voice 
over IP) [11]. 
One of the most important aspects for every 
steganographic method is the choice of the proper carrier for 
the secret data. The most favorable carrier for secret 
messages must have two features: 
 It should be popular, that is, usage of such a carrier 
should not be considered as an anomaly itself. The more 
such carriers are present and utilized in networks the 
better it is, because they mask the existence of hidden 
communication. 
 Modification of the carrier related to the embedding of 
the steganogram should not be “visible” to the third party 
unaware of the steganographic procedure. Contrary to 
typical steganographic methods, which utilize digital 
media (pictures, audio and video files) as a cover for 
hidden data (steganogram), network steganography 
utilizes communication protocol control elements and 
their basic intrinsic functionality. As a result, such 
methods may be harder to detect and eliminate. 
 
Thus, because of its popularity and traffic volume, 
BitTorrent’s traffic is an ideal candidate for the hidden data 
carrier. In this paper, we present detailed analysis of 
potential opportunities for information hiding in BitTorrent. 
Each network steganography method can be 
characterized by three features. First, steganographic 
bandwidth that describes how much secret data one is able to 
send using a particular method per time unit. Second, 
undetectability, defined as an inability to detect a 
steganogram inside certain carriers. The most popular way to 
detect a steganogram is to analyze the statistical properties 
of the captured data and compare them to the typical 
properties of that carrier. The last feature is the 
steganographic cost, which describes the degree of 
degradation of the carrier caused by the steganogram 
insertion procedure. The steganographic cost depends on the 
type of carrier, and, if it becomes excessive, it leads to easier 
detection of the steganographic method. For example, if the 
method uses voice packets as a hidden data carrier for 
steganographic purposes in IP telephony, then the 
steganographic cost is expressed in conversation 
degradation. If the hidden data carrier is a certain field of the 
protocol header, then the cost is expressed as a potential loss 
in that protocol functionality, and so forth. 
For each network steganography method, a trade-off is 
always necessary between maximizing steganographic 
bandwidth and still remaining undetected (and retaining an 
acceptable level of the steganographic cost). A user can 
utilize a method naively and send as much secret data as 
possible, but it simultaneously raises the risk of disclosure. 
Therefore, he/she must purposely resign from some fraction 
of the steganographic bandwidth in order to be undetectable. 
We wish to also emphasize that network steganography 
can be utilized by decent users to exchange covert data, for 
example, to circumvent censorship, to provide a 
communication channel between journalists and their 
information sources or by companies that are afraid of 
corporate espionage, but it can also be used by intruders to 
leak confidential data or to perform network attacks. This is 
the usual trade-off that requires consideration in a broader 
information hiding context, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
introduces the basics of the BitTorrent P2P system. Section 
III presents the current state of research efforts on 
steganography in P2P networks and in BitTorrent in 
particular. Section IV describes the proposed steganographic 
method: StegTorrent, while in Section V the obtained 
experimental results are presented. Finally, Section VI 
concludes our work. 
II. BITTORRENT BASICS 
BitTorrent is a P2P file sharing system that allows its 
users to distribute large amounts of data (especially large 
files) over IP networks. BitTorrent is distinguished from 
other similar file-transfer applications in that instead of 
downloading a resource (one or more files) from a single 
source (e.g. a central server), users download fragmented 
files from other users at the same time. As a result, the file-
transfer time is considerably decreased because the group of 
users that share the same resource (or part of it) may consist 
of several to thousands of hosts. Such a group of users 
interested in the same resource (known as “peers”) combine 
together with a central component (known as a “tracker”) in 
BitTorrent. This combination of peers and trackers is called 
a “swarm”. Trackers are responsible for controlling the 
resource transfer between the peers. Peers that hold onto a 
particular resource or part of a resource are required to share 
the resource and to perform the transfer. 
We can distinguish two types of BitTorrent peers based 
on the stage at which they are involved in downloading or 
sharing a given resource. These types are: 
 Seeds—peers that possess the complete resource and are 
only sharing it. 
 Leechers—peers that do not possess the complete 
resource but they are interested in doing so. They also 
share the fragments they have already downloaded. 
When a leecher obtains all the remaining fragments of 
the resource it automatically becomes a seed. 
 
In BitTorrent specification ([1], [2]), two main protocols 
are described that regulate data transfer: peer-tracker and 
peer-peer. 
The connection between peer and tracker can be 
established with the use of an HTTP (Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol), or through UDP-based requests. Currently, the 
role of the tracker is diminished. The tracker is used mostly 
to initiate the connection with a swarm. After the connection 
is established, popular BitTorrent extensions like PEX (Peer 
Exchange) [2] or DHT (Distributed Hash Table) [4] are 
used. These extensions enable communication between 
peers without using a tracker as part of the swarm. 
In a BitTorrent specification, peer-peer data exchange 
should be conducted using an application layer—a 
proprietary TCP-based protocol. It is a stateful protocol that 
is used to establish connections similar to the TCP 
handshake mechanism. However, it is also possible that 
instead of using TCP protocols in a transport layer, UDP-
based μTP (µTorrent Transport Protocol) [15] should be 
used. This UDP-based protocol was introduced in 2009. It is 
not part of the original BitTorrent specification, but it was 
created by BitTorrent Inc., and as the results of a previous 
study indicated [14], it is currently the most popular choice. 
The main aim of the μTP protocol is to efficiently 
manage usage of the available bandwidth during file 
transfers, while limiting the impact of file transfers on the 
on-going transmissions (especially non-BitTorrent related 
ones). The μTP protocol is capable of automatically 
reducing the rate at which BitTorrent packets are transmitted 
between peers in case there is interference with other 
applications running on the same host. This protocol uses a 
congestion control algorithm, which is a modified version of 
LEDBAT (Low Extra Delay Background Transport) [5], 
based on one-way delay measurements. The μTP protocol 
was implemented in the very popular BitTorrent client, 
μTorrent (http://www.utorrent.com) beginning with version 
2.0, and it is currently used by default. This protocol is also 
used in other BitTorrent clients, such as in BitTorrent 
(http://www.bittorrent.com), Vuze (http://www.vuze.com), 
or Transmission (http://www.transmissionbt.com). 
The μTP header format is illustrated in Fig. 1 and the 
field roles are explained below. 
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Figure 1.  μTP header format. 
The fields are utilized as follows [15]: 
 Ver—version of the protocol. Currently version 1 is used. 
 Type—packet type. Currently four types are defined: 
ST_DATA = 0—data packet, ST_FIN = 1— packet that 
ends the connection, ST_STATE = 2—acknowledgment 
packet (ack_nr field), without any other data, 
ST_RESET = 3—packet that forces the end of the 
connection, ST_SYN = 4—initializes the connection. 
 Extension—type of the first extension on the extension 
list. Currently two types are specified: Selective acks and 
Extension. More about these extensions can be found in 
[15]. 
 Connection_id—random, unique number that is a 
connection identifier. 
 Timestamp_microseconds—Number of microseconds 
from the last full second that passed from the time the 
last packet was sent from the local machine. 
 Timestamp_difference_microseconds—the difference 
between the local time and the timestamp in the last 
received packet, at the time the last packet was received. 
This is the latest one-way delay measurement of the link 
from the remote peer to the local machine. 
 Wnd_size—Advertised receive window (in bytes). 
 Seq_nr—the sequence number of this packet. 
 Ack_nr—the sequence number the sender of the packet 
last received from the remote peer. 
 
From the abovementioned header fields, the 
Timestamp_microseconds would play an important role for 
the proposed steganographic method. 
Typically, the BitTorrent client establishes many 
connections with other peers during the whole transmission 
process—typically about 70 [14]. BitTorrent connections are 
characterized by the high packet rate and a single resource is 
downloaded by a number of clients simultaneously (one-to-
many transmission). This is also exemplarily illustrated in 
Figure 2 where it may be observed that the order in which 
packets to different clients are generated is highly variable 
and that the packets for different network localizations are 
heavily interleaved with each other. 
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Figure 2.  High variability in order in which packets to different clients 
are generated  
That is why, due to its variability and high volume, the 
order in which the packets are sent or received by the client 
can be utilized as a carrier for hidden data exchange. This 
feature is used by StegTorrent to enable clandestine 
communication for the BitTorrent service. 
III. RELATED WORK 
Steganography in P2P networks has been previously 
targeted by the research community. Information hiding 
techniques were utilized there to: 
 Create a steganographic storage service—Mnemosyne 
[8]—that applies steganography from a local storage 
system [9] to a distributed, peer-to-peer system that is 
based on distributed hash tables, 
 Build an adaptive covert communication system [12]. 
 
However, none of the abovementioned works proposed 
steganographic methods that utilize P2P-system-specific 
protocols—they reused well-known existing ones. 
To the authors’ best knowledge, only two papers 
discussed BitTorrent-specific steganographic methods. In 
2008 Li et al. [6] proposed to utilize torrent meta files to 
hide information. Two approaches were specified there: one 
was based on changing the case of the letters in the URL 
addresses and the other reused some of the torrent file fields. 
Both these approaches are now obsolete since URLs are now 
being replaced by Magnet-URIs (http://magnet-
uri.sourceforge.net). 
Eidenbenz et al. [7] introduced an interesting concept for 
hidden communication in P2P networks and for BitTorrent 
in particular. The key idea is to allow conspiring peers to 
find one another without being revealed by means of the so 
called steganographic handshake and broadcast. 
The authors propose enabling hidden communication to 
vary the fragment request sequence (request order channel). 
Few other methods are sketched there as alternatives for the 
above mentioned that is based on: 
 Selection of a subset of fragments to be requested 
according to a shared secret—this is an enhancement of 
the method described above. 
 Applying variations in the timing of the P2P protocol 
messages or the rate at which resource fragments are 
sent. For protocol messages it can be achieved, for 
example, by embedding secret data into the time between 
the reception of a fragment request and the 
corresponding transmission. For resource fragments (or 
rather packets), the rate at which they are sent is 
modified to enable hidden communication. For these 
methods, the authors conclude that they are feasible if 
the connection between the peers is stable and that, in 
real-life networks, usage of the correction codes is 
necessary. This is in fact a known problem for 
steganographic methods that utilize time relations [13] as 
well as requiring synchronization and achieving 
generally lower steganographic bandwidth than other 
methods. 
 Setting the port number that contains hidden 
information—as the authors indicate themselves, this 
method is of limited use as a port number does not 
change during connection, thus only its initial value can 
be utilized. This results in very low steganographic 
bandwidth. 
 
Unfortunately, it must also be emphasized that for the 
methods described above the authors did not provide any 
experimental results, thus they were not properly evaluated. 
However, they have proved feasible in the publicly available 
implementation BitThief (http://bitthief.ethz.ch). 
 
In this paper, we propose a new steganographic method 
for BitTorrent—StegTorrent. The proposed method relies on 
the modification of the order of the data packets in the peer-
peer data exchange protocol. The reordering of the packets is 
not new in the context of network steganography and it is a 
part of the broader group of methods that modify time 
relations between PDUs (Protocol Data Units) [10]. PDUs 
can be affected by modifying their inter-packet delay or 
introducing intentional losses or reordering. The first 
proposed utilization of the reordering for network protocol 
was by Kundur and Ahsan [18]. To be able to control packet 
sorting, they proposed using sequence number fields from 
the IPSec protocol headers: ESP (Encapsulating Security 
Payload) and AH (Authentication Header). Also Chakinala 
et al. [17] studied and formalized various models for hidden 
communication in ordered channels and presented 
simulation results for TCP traffic. However, all of these 
methods were lacking in undetectability or steganographic 
bandwidth. In real-life IP networks, the reordering in unicast 
transmissions (as the authors assume) is not witnessed often. 
Thus, when intentional reordering is exploited excessively it 
would be easy to discover, and when it is limited then the 
resulting steganographic bandwidth is low (typically a few 
bits per second or less). Moreover, such a solution typically 
requires a synchronization mechanism to correctly extract 
secret data. StegTorrent takes advantage of the facts that in 
BitTorrent there are usually one-to-many transmissions and 
that the μTP header provides a means for packet numbering 
and retrieval of their original sequence. This allows the 
provision of quite a high steganographic bandwidth 
(hundreds of bits per second) under the terms of 
undetectability with no requirements on synchronization. 
IV. STEGTORRENT DESCRIPTION 
The clandestine communication scenario we consider for 
the proposed method is illustrated in Figure 3. We assume 
that both the secret data sending and receiving sides are in 
control of a certain number of BitTorrent clients and, as 
mentioned above, their IP addresses are known to each 
other. In Figure 3, for the sake of clarity, only single 
direction steganographic transmission is presented, but of 
course, end-to-end bidirectional communication is possible 
and the other direction is analogous. No knowledge of the 
network’s topology is necessary. The hidden data sender 
uses the modified BitTorrent client—StegTorrent client—to 
share a resource that is downloaded by the second 
StegTorrent client that consists of a group of controlled 
BitTorrent clients. 
 
 
Figure 3.  StegTorrent hidden data exchange scenario. 
For the sake of the proposed method’s description and 
analysis, we define the term data package as a set of IP 
addresses that is sent within the IP packets in a 
predetermined order and the term data package size as the 
total number of elements in this set. For example, let us 
assume that the data package size is 2. In this case, two 
packets with two different IP addresses (e.g. IP1 and IP2) 
are used to send bits of hidden data. In this simple scenario, 
if the order of the packets is modified for steganographic 
purposes, the BitTorrent client receives a packet that was 
sent from IP1 and then from IP2, then it will be interpreted 
as binary “0”, in other case binary “1”. We assume that the 
data package and its size are a shared secret between 
transmitting and receiving StegTorrent clients. 
It must be noted that this method’s performance depends 
on the size of the data package while the latter relies on the 
number of available receiving IP addresses (receiving 
BitTorrent clients under control). 
A. Sender side 
As mentioned above, the secret data bits are encoded in 
the order in which the data packets are sent to the particular 
set of receiving clients. For example, if the secret data 
receiver controls two clients, A and B, then if the specific 
packet reaches A first and then B, then it would mean 
sending binary “0”; in the other case it will be interpreted as 
binary “1”. To encode hidden data bits, Lehmer code is 
utilized [16] (the encoding is known a priori to the secret 
data sender and receiver). Then for n different numbers of IP 
addresses we are able to encode ⌊log2(n!)⌋ bits per data 
package. For example, for four packets with different IP 
addresses in a data package we are able to send 4 bits. 
However, if the StegTorrent sender relies only on 
modifying the order of the data packets in which they were 
generated by the transmitter, then, due to poor network 
conditions, the order of the packet could be changed. This 
could potentially lead to problems with successful 
steganogram extraction. The solution is to incorporate into 
StegTorrent the intentional modification of the 
timestamp_microseconds field from the μTP protocol (see 
Section II). Values from these fields allow the unambiguous 
recognition of the order in which the packets were originally 
transmitted in the typical BitTorrent client. 
By intentionally modulating these values while 
generating packets to enforce certain sequences, the sender 
can ensure that, even if the order of the transmitted packets 
is disrupted, the receiver would be able to correctly extract 
bits of the steganogram. 
B. Receiver side 
The secret data receiver gathers all the information from 
the BitTorrent clients under the control of StegTorrent 
during the resource download session. Then it orders the 
packets’ IP addresses based on their 
timestamp_microseconds values and begins the extraction of 
secret data bits. 
To understand how the StegTorrent receiver works, the 
following example is presented below. Let us assume that 
the data package size is 5 and we denote packets sent to the 
five IP addresses: 1 when the packet is sent to IP1, 2 when 
the packet is sent to IP2 and so on. Let us further assume 
that by X we will be denoting packets sent to IP addresses 
outside the data package. If the exemplary packets’ stream 
is: 
 
1, 4, 4, X, X, 4, 4, 3, X, 3, 3, 5, 2, 2, 5, 5, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, X, 5, … 
 
then, because the even number of packets from the same 
number are omitted and X are not taken into account, the 
receiver will extract the following secret bits colored with 
yellow: 
 
1, 4, 4, X, X, 4, 4, 3, X, 3, 3, 5, 2, 2, 5, 5, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, X, | 5 … 
 
The resulting data package is {1, 3, 5, 2, 4}. Then this 
package is mapped to certain predefined secret data bit 
sequences. The last packet from IP5 (marked with grey) is 
the beginning of the new data package since the size of the 
data package is 5. 
If some packets are lost then the secret data receiver will 
wait for retransmission which is ensured by the μTP 
protocol. The retransmitted packet will have the same 
timestamp_microseconds value as the original one. After the 
packet is retransmitted and the received data is complete, the 
secret data receiver is ready to extract the secret data. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To experimentally evaluate the proposed steganographic 
method, the StegTorrent prototype implementation was 
developed and the test-bed was setup (Fig. 4). The presented 
scenario is a simpler version of that presented in Figure 3; 
however, the main principles and functioning of the 
proposed method remain the same. In this test-bed, twenty 
sessions of resource downloading were performed and the 
average results are presented. For each session 500 000 µTP 
packets and the corresponding logs were captured and 
subjected to analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4.  StegTorrent hidden data exchange scenario 
First, we analyzed the number of packets that were sent 
from different IP addresses during each session. The 
information obtained can then be utilized to pinpoint the best 
number of IP addresses that can be used to create a package 
and to achieve the highest steganographic bandwidth under 
the terms of the method’s undetectability. 
The obtained results are presented in Figure 5. Only the 
ten most active IP addresses are presented separately and the 
rest are aggregated. Each session is described as xTy where x 
denotes the number of downloaded resources and y is the 
number of the session. As expected, the results vary greatly, 
which is beneficial from the undetectability point of view. 
That is why, in Figure 6, we also present the most different 
cases as well as the average. 
 
Figure 5.  Distribution of number of packets sent from different IP 
addresses during single resource downloading session (in %); xTy – x 
denotes number of downloaded resources and y is the number of the 
session. 
It turned out that in every session there was at least one 
IP address that was dominant and responsible for sending, in 
most cases, more than 25% of the total number of packets 
(the result falls in the 16–77% range). It is also worth noting 
that, in most cases, more than 75% of all packets are sent by 
six different IP addresses and that this is why this number 
was selected as the maximum size of the analyzed package 
in the following measurements. 
   
Figure 6.  Examples of distribution of number of packets sent from 
different IP addresses during a single resource downloading session (in %) 
– (a) balanced (1T3), (b) single IP address dominant (1T20), (c) average. 
Next, we analyzed the achieved StegTorrent 
steganographic bandwidth as well as the utilization of 
packets in the created covert channel that is defined as the 
ratio between the number of packets used for the creation of 
data packages (thus sending secret data) and number of all 
packets received during the session. The measurements were 
conducted for three cases, where: 
 All of the IP addresses are utilized for data package 
creation (Case A), 
 The number of IP addresses equals the size of the 
package (Case B), 
 The number of IP addresses used for data package 
creation is 6 (Case C). 
 
Case A is the least practical due to the requirement to 
control the endpoints with all IP addresses that took part in 
resource downloading—Cases B and C are definitely more 
realistic. Moreover, for B and C only, the most active IP 
addresses were utilized, that is those that sent the largest 
number of packets during the downloading session. In each 
case, the five different sizes of data packages were analyzed 
from 2 to 6. The following figures and tables present the 
average results. 
Table I presents the obtained experimental results for 
single resource downloading sessions for cases A–C. 
Obviously, the best results were achieved for Case A where 
all IP addresses were used for package creation. However, as 
mentioned before, in practice, this is the most difficult 
scenario to accomplish. Steganographic bandwidth for this 
case is in the range 430–660 b/s and it increases with the 
increase in package size. On the other hand, packet 
utilization with small package sizes is more than 50% while, 
with the package size increase, it falls to about 30%. 
TABLE I.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR SINGLE RESOURCE 
DOWNLOADING SCENARIO 
Case 
# 
Data 
package 
size 
Steganographic 
bandwidth [b/s] 
Standard 
deviation 
[b/s] 
Packets 
utililzation 
[%] 
A 2 438.41 106.43 65.05 
A 3 467.28 120.51 51.69 
A 4 590.49 162.88 43.36 
A 5 607.73 176.89 37.07 
A 6 656.01 200.88 31.93 
B 2 82.82 54.87 11.50 
B 3 66.29 38.33 6.95 
B 4 67.99 52.16 4.24 
B 5 63.99 46.10 2.99 
B 6 74.30 51.25 2.51 
C 2 273.00 93.27 40.49 
C 3 239.02 91.96 26.17 
C 4 227.95 106.01 16.46 
C 5 138.59 96.52 8.10 
C 6 74.30 51.25 2.51 
 
The experimental results obtained for Case C were 
significantly better than for Case B for small package sizes. 
It is worth noting that the steganographic bandwidth for 
Case B and a package size of 6 is more than three times 
lower than for Case C and package size 2, while the latter is 
easier to implement. This is caused by the usually not well 
balanced distribution of packets from different IP addresses 
(Fig. 6, c). That is why, when the larger data package size is 
utilized, a considerable number of packets from IP addresses 
that are chosen for steganographic purposes are not carrying 
any secret data (they are not included in packages). This in 
turn results in very low packet utilization for larger data 
package sizes (<10% for sizes equal to 5 or 6). 
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Figure 7.  Packet utilization for different data packages sizes (case C). 
Finally, Figure 7 illustrates packet utilization for 
different data packages sizes for Case C and sessions 1T3, 
1T20 and the average (from Fig. 6). It proves that packet 
utilization in StegTorrent is related to the distribution of the 
number of packets sent from different IP addresses, but not 
as much as could be expected. In other words even if there is 
a dominant IP address (like in Fig. 6, b) packet utilization 
does not decrease considerably when compared to the 
average results (about 7%) and the difference is smaller for 
larger data package sizes (2–5%). Also, as mentioned before, 
packet utilization decreases with the increase in data 
package size. 
The StegTorrent steganographic cost is negligible, since 
it only introduces a small delay in resource downloading by 
re-sorting the packets in the predefined order. This is 
completely transparent to the BitTorrent client. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a new BitTorrent-specific method 
called StegTorrent that relies on the modification of the 
order of data packets in the peer-peer data exchange 
protocol. StegTorrent takes advantage of the facts that in 
BitTorrent there are usually many-to-one transmissions and 
that the μTP header provides a means of packet numbering 
and retrieval of their original sequence. This allows the 
provision of quite a high steganographic bandwidth, of about 
270 b/s, for the most realistic scenario under the terms of 
undetectability and with no requirement for synchronization. 
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